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this Constitutional provision was enacted, the case of .kron v. Roth,
88 Ohio St. 456, 103 N.E. 465 (1912), was decided. The Court in
that case said that not only need the case be one of "public or great
general interest," but also that error has probably intervened. Some
eight years later, (1920) the Court in ruling on a motion said, "over-
ruled, the Court finding that the case is one of public interest, but no
error has intervened." Records of the Supreme Cour , Case Number
I6,71o, journal 28, page 476, July I6, 192o.
This notation has not been repeated that we know of, but it is some
indication that the Court considers the factor of probable error when
passing on a motion to certify. It seems an inescapable conclusion that
this was in fact, for the particular case, at least, an aflirmance of the
lower court, for the Supreme Court admittedly had jurisdiction, because
the case was of "public or great general interest," but the Court refused
it because it thought that there was no error in the case.
This suggests that a milder reform might be to use formal reasons,
similar to these, in disposing of these motions. Thus perhaps the advan-
tages sought after by the Ohio Bar Ass'n. in its resolution, without the
attending disadvantages of binding precedent or excessive labor on the
part of the Court would be attained. In giving these reasons, the Court
would not be binding itself irrevocably to one position, for it would
merely be an indication of how the Court reacts to a given question
upon a cursory examination. And of course, the Court would not be
faced by the task of writing an opinion on the case, but could dispose of
the whole problem by designating a number of these reasons.
The problem clearly merits further study and thought by those
connected with the profession with a view to evolving a plan which will
satisfy both the judiciary and the bar.
CARL R. JOHNSON.
Automobiles
NEGLIGENCE - DOCTRINE OF ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE
AHEAD - STATUTE AS SUBJECTIVE TEST.
The defendant stopped his truck on the highway. The evidence
tended to show that there was no negligence in parking the truck but
that there was no tail light burning. The night was dark, rainy, and
foggy; the deceased was driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour and
had just met a car coming from the opposite direction. Under such
circumstances the deceased collided with the rear end of the truck and
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was killed. The court directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground
that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law in violating Section 12603 of the General Code which prohibits
motor vehicles from being operated at a speed greater than will permit
them to be brought to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
Gumley, zldm'r v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, I Ohio Op. 318, 193
N.E. 627 (1934).
At common law the courts were not in accord on this question.
Some states held that it was negligence as a matter of law to drive at a
speed greater than would permit stopping within the range of the
driver's vision. West Constr. Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520, 172 S.W.
301 (1914); Spencer v. Taylor, 2i9 Mich. iio, I88 N.W. 461
(z922); Fisher v. O'Bren, 99 Kan. 621, I92 Pac. 317, L.R.A.
i91 7 F, 61o (917). But the probable weight of authority required
that the question of the driver's negligence be submitted to the determi-
nation of the jury, taking into account all the facts and circumstances.
Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer & Co., oo Conn. 114, 123 Ad. 16
(923); Morehouse v. Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 Pac. 157
(1926). In 1921 the Court of Appeals for Ashtabula county adopted
the former rule. Webster v. Pollock, 15 Ohio App. 102. But after that
case Ohio courts have followed the latter rule. Tresise v. Ashdown
x8 Ohio St. 307, 16o N.E. 898, 58 A.L.R. 1476 (1928); Spreng
v. Flaherty, 4o Ohio App. 21, 177 N.E. 528 (1931).
In 1929, however, Section 126o3 of the General Code was
amended to include the following: "and no person shall drive any motor
vehicle in and upon any public road or highway at a greater speed than
will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead." 113 Ohio Laws 283.
The violation of a staute intended to protect the safey of persons
in the position of the plaintiff or defendant is negligence as a matter of
law or negligence per se. Schell v. Dubois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E.
664, L.R.A. 19 I7 A, 71o (1916). Thus, the first Ohio case to deal
with the amendment to Section 12603 held that the language of the
statute "is a specific requirement of law, a violation of which constitutes
negligence per se." Skinner v. Penn. Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186
N.E. 722 (933). Much reliance was placed on the case of Bowmaster
v. William H. DePree Co., 252 Mich. 505, 233 N.W. 395 (930)
which interpreted a similar statute of that state. The Michigan statute
was passed in 1927 but her courts had previously held the rule that
failure to stop within the assured dear distance ahead was negligence per
se at common law.
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In the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Gumley ldmn'r v. Cowman,
48 Ohio App. 300, 40 O.L.R. 230, 17 Ohio Abs. 255, 1 Ohio Op.
450 (1934) the judge stated: "We are aware of the fact that this
conclusion of law would leave the driver of an automobile, injured by
his running into an obstruction in the road, without any remedy for
injuries by reason of negligence on the part of the other person... "
But the Supreme Court in affirming the decision stated: "This court
entertains no such view as to the intention of the Legislature in enacting
this amendment . . . . under proper circumstances the questions of
proxim ate cause and negligence on the part of such driver must be sub-
mitted to the jury . . . . the present legislative requirement establishes
a subjective test whereby a driver is prohibited from operating any motor
vehicle . . . . at a rate of speed greater than will permit him to bring
it to a stop within the distance at which he can see a discernible object
obstructing his path." Other cases would agree that a jury question as
to the visibility of the object may arise. Kadlec v. .41. Johnson Constr.
Co., 217 Iowa 299, 252 N.W. 103 (1933). But it is difficult to recon-
cile the statement that the language of the amendment "is a specific
requirement of law, a violation of which constitute negligence per se,"
Skinner v. Penn. Rd. Co., supra, with the statement that it establishes a
subjective test. No case has been discovered in which the term "subjec-
tive test" has been used in this connection, and the exact meaning of it
does not seem to be clear.
Exceptions are being made, and certainly they should be made, to
the rule as laid down in the Skinner case. The Ohio Court of Appeals
has held that the "assured dear distance ahead" applies only to the lane
in which the driver is traveling; and if he is forced to go into another
lane and strikes an unlighted truck, it is not negligence as a matter ofA
law. Schaeffer-Weaver Co. v. Malloun, 45 Ohio App. I, 38 O.L.R.
247, 186 N.E. 514 (1933). Also it would seem to be implicit in the
wording of Section 12603 that the rule would not apply where the
object with which the automobile collides moves into the automobile's
path. The court may decide to relax the rule where the driver's vision
is interfered with by the lights of an approaching automobile, although
the Michigan court has refused to do so. Ruth v. Vroom, 245 Mich. 88,
222 N.W. 155, 62 A.L.R. 1528 (1928).
At present there is a bill (Sub. S.B. No. 133) passed by the Senate
and pending in the House to amend Section 12603 by inserting in place
of the paragraph quoted above the following: "In all cases where the
driver of a motor vehicle on public thoroughfares is driving within the
speed limit allowed by law, the question of assured dear distance shall
be a matter of fact to be submitted to the jury for its determination."
In this form the bill says nothing about being*able to stop within the
assured clear distance ahead. Although the intent of the author of the
bill seems to be plain to one who knows the history of the statute, it may
be questioned whether, for the sake of clarity, he should not have in-
cluded another sentence.
D. M. POSTLEWAITE.
Bankruptcy
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER BY INSOLVENT DEBTOR-RIGHTS OF
CREDITORS TO SUE AFTER ADJUDICATION OF BANKRUPTCY
AND APPOINTMENT OF A TRUSTEE
In Winter's National Bank and Trust Company v. Midland A4c-
ceptance Corporation, 47 Ohio App. 324, 191 N.E. 889 (934, pre-
viously annotated on another point, "Chattel Mortgages and the Bulk
Sales Act," 7 Ohio Bar May 6, 1935), a creditor brought his action
to set aside a conveyance alleged to be in violation of the Bulk Sales
Act, Section I 102, General Code, after the adjudication in bankruptcy
and the appointment of the trustee. The latter, on the following day,
filed his intervening petition. In their opinion the court said, "The right
to institute the action which the plaintiff (creditor) sought to prosecute
was, by the adjudication of Gessaman, the bankrupt, and the appoint-
ment of a trustee, vested in the representative of all of Gessaman's credi-
tors, the trustee," and so dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
This raises the problem of under what circumstances a creditor may
sue to set aside allegedly fraudulent transfers by an insolvent debtor.
When a creditor sues prior to bankruptcy to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance, his right is not interfered with by the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy and the subsequent appointment of a trustee unless the latter
intervenes. Walker v. Connell, 54 Sup. Ct. 251, 24 Am. B.R. (n.s.)
229 (1934). A similar result would seem to follow when the creditor
sues subsequent to bankruptcy but prior to the apopintment of the trustee.
Frost v. Latham, 181 Fed. 866 (191o). And where a trustee was not
appointed after a debtor had been adjudicated a bankrupt, a creditor has
been permitted to sue in his own name. Guarantee Title and Trust Co.
v. Pearlman, 144 Fed. 550, i6 Am. B.R. 461 (i9o6). However, the
trustee, after he is appointed, may intervene and collect the assets for
the benefit of the estate. Matter of Vadner, 42 Am. B.R. 465 (1918) ;
In Re Rogers, 125 Fed. 169, x1 Am. B.R. 79 (1903). After the
287NOTES AND COMMENTS
